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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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## THESIS

AN APPLICATION OF CONTENT ANALYSIS  
TO DETERMINE CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR  
IN RELATION TO THE DEFENSE BUDGET

by

Robert Thomas Camp

June 1977

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An Application of Content Analysis  
to Determine Congressional Behavior  
in Relation to the Defense Budget

by

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## ABSTRACT

Congress exercises its power over the federal purse and the Defense Budget through its budgetary process. This thesis is part of a continuing effort to analyze the changing role of Congress in Defense policy-making. The fiscal/programmatic orientation of various Congressional committees in relation to the Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation portions of the Defense Budget is determined through use of the research technique - Content Analysis. The period of analysis includes fiscal years 1976 and 1977, the first two years to be affected by the new Congressional budgetary process prescribed by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Individual committee decisions and comments were recorded and categorized as fiscal or programmatic. It was concluded that committee decisions concerning the Defense Budget were fairly equally divided between a fiscal and programmatic orientation. An extensive background section and description of Content Analysis introduces the specific methodology used in this analysis.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis is part of a larger, on-going research project for the purpose of furthering knowledge of the changing role of Congress in Defense policy-making. It has been recognized throughout American history that Congress' power over the "federal purse strings" has been its most important lever to influence military policy. James Madison, writing in The Federalist Papers, is quoted as saying, "this power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any country can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a redress of every grievance and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure" [Ref. 33, pp. 298-299].

Congress has attempted to exercise this power of the purse through its budgetary processing of the Department of Defense's annual budget. A continuing question concerning the changing role of Congress in Defense policy-making has been whether Congress makes its budgetary decisions on a purely fiscal or on a broader programmatic basis. A 1973 article in the Naval War College Review by Lawrence J. Korb contained an excellent discussion of the fiscal/programmatic hypotheses [Ref. 21]. Korb defined the two as follows:

"The fiscal position, or hypothesis, implies that Congress is primarily concerned with the level of defense spending. If this hypothesis is correct, then congressional action on the

defense budget would focus on eliminating waste and inefficiencies and would take the form of across-the-board reductions or extending spending programs over longer periods. On the other hand, the programmatic hypothesis infers that Congress addresses the defense budget in policy terms and uses its power of the purse as a tool to influence the shape of defense programs. If this hypothesis has validity then the Congress would be concerned with such areas as the level of the manpower in the armed services and the type of weapons in the inventory" [Ref. 21, p. 50].

This thesis attempted to determine the fiscal/programmatic orientation of congress toward the Defense Budget through the use of a research technique known as Content Analysis. The Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation titles of the Defense Budget were chosen for evaluation since several recent studies have indicated that Congress has focused its attention on these two areas [Refs. 18, 21, & 28]. Past research efforts have selected to study a certain Congressional committee over various time periods with the intent of determining whether the overall trend of committee action toward the Defense Budget was fiscal or programmatic [Refs. 23 & 4]. This study took a somewhat different approach in that it attempted to assess the fiscal/programmatic nature of the various committees (i.e. House and Senate Armed Services, Appropriations and Budget Committees) involved in the Defense budgetary process during a certain time period. A comparison was made between the committees and the overall orientation of Congress determined. The time period chosen for evaluation was fiscal

years 1976 and 1977. These two years were chosen since they were the first to be affected by the new Congressional budgetary process prescribed by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This Act was a major budgetary reform measure and a means by which Congress reasserted its power of the purse.

In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the budgetary atmosphere and environment prevailing at the time this study was conducted, an extensive background chapter is included. This chapter contains a brief history of Congressional budgetary reform measures, the Defense budgetary process prior to fiscal year 1976, the major changes introduced by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and a survey of budgetary literature. Chapter III is a detailed synopsis of Content Analysis. Readers familiar with this research technique could omit this chapter without a loss in context. The methodology of analysis and summary of findings are described in Chapters IV and V, respectively. Chapter VI includes conclusions drawn as to the fiscal/programmatic orientation of Congress, assessed impact of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and suggestions for further research.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY REFORM MEASURES

The changing role of Congress in the budgetary process is evident from a brief review of United States budget history. Congress has not always been in firm control of the federal purse strings, and its efforts to gain control have often resulted in the breakdown of many reform measures.

With passage of the Treasury Act in 1789, President Washington appointed Alexander Hamilton to the position of Secretary of the Treasury. The first U.S. budget, developed by Hamilton in 1789, was a single executive type budget separated into only four major line items and totaled a sum not to exceed \$645,000 [Ref. 5, p. 34]. This process was repeated in 1790 and 1791, but in 1792 Congress required that items of expenditure be specified in greater detail [Ref. 5, p. 36]. Hamilton complied with Congress' request by submitting detailed budget estimates, but in actual practice, he transferred funds between line items with a free will. Since Hamilton did not provide Congress with regular reports of Treasury expenditures, Congress seldom knew where the funds were going [Ref. 30, pp. 50-51].

By 1796, Congress realized that the Secretary of the Treasury, not Congress, actually controlled the budget. In an attempt to gain power, Congress established a temporary Committee on Ways and Means which was responsible for

handling both appropriations and revenues. This new committee slowly began to gain control of the federal purse.

During the administration of President Jefferson, Congress established a permanent Ways and Means Committee. The executive agencies presented their budget requests directly to this House committee and, in so doing, virtually eliminated direct Treasury influence in the preparation and control of the nation's budget [Ref. 5, p. 61]. However, the War and Navy Departments continued the illegal practice of transferring funds. When Congress enacted legislation to prevent these illegal fund transfers, the War and Navy Departments adopted the practice of spending lapsed appropriations (unspent funds from previous years no longer available for obligation). In 1852 the War and Navy Appropriations Acts further prohibited the transfer of funds, and other acts imposed new restrictions on the use of unspent funds. With these practices stymied, the Services created deliberate deficiencies by entering into contracts in advance of appropriations as a means of circumventing Congressional controls [Ref. 60, p. 110].

In an attempt to further strengthen its controls over spending by the Services, Congress created the following additional committees during the 1800's [Ref. 14, pp. 4-5]:

<u>HOUSE</u>	<u>SENATE</u>
1822 - Military Affairs (Armed Services*)	1816 - Military Affairs (Armed Services*)
1822 - Naval Affairs (Armed Services*)	1816 - Naval Affairs (Armed Services*)
1865 - Appropriations	1867 - Appropriations

\* Name of present committee.

In 1906 Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Act which, despite some flaws, was the most substantial budget reform bill enacted to date. Under its provisions, expenditures in excess of appropriations were prohibited except for cases in which contracts or obligations had previously been authorized by law. The Act also provided for the apportionment of appropriations by monthly or other allotments. The Act erred in allowing the head of the executive agency the discretionary authority to change the apportionment amount. The apportionment procedure was abused and it was this factor that caused the Act to fall short of its objective of precluding the need for deficiency appropriations [Ref. 5].

Debate over control of the budget continued up until passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 when control began to swing away from Congress and toward the Presidency. This Act introduced three main provisions: (1) it provided for a comprehensive Presidential budget, (2) it established a Bureau of the Budget (later to become the Office of Management and Budget) directly responsible to the President to assist in formulation of the budget, and

(3) it created a General Accounting Office headed by the Comptroller General and controlled by Congress. The Bureau of the Budget staff of the President evolved into a powerful and dynamic organization for which Congress had no effective counterpart [Ref. 30, pp. 73-80].

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was certainly the most comprehensive budgetary reform legislation ever enacted. For the first time in history, the United States had a budget process requiring formulation by the President, authorization and appropriation by Congress, execution under direction of the President, and an independent audit by the General Accounting Office as a means of Congressional review. Contemporary critics of the 1921 Act have asserted that Congress itself yielded control over government spending to the President and that the period from 1921 was marked by further erosion of Congressional influence in budget-making decisions [Ref. 30, pp. 80-88].

Several other attempts for budgetary reform originated in the 1940's and 1950's. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 established a large joint Congressional committee which was tasked to analyze the President's budget and then formulate a separate legislative budget which would reflect Congressional priorities. The concept was optimistically received by both the House and Senate; however, it was attempted only twice - in 1947 and 1948 without success in either year. In 1947 Congress was never able to agree on



a budget ceiling. In 1948 a budget ceiling was established but later ignored in actual spending practice. The procedure remained inactive until it was repealed by the Reorganization Act of 1970 [Ref. 34, p. 3473].

Congress introduced an Omnibus Appropriations Bill in 1950. This action was an attempt to include all regular appropriations in one bill. This approach was successful in the sense that Congress completed its action on time, but it lacked popular support in both the Legislative and Executive Branches. It was consequently abandoned after a one year trial [Ref. 34, p. 3474].

After 50 years of operating under a budget system established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress recognized that its budgetary process still contained numerous shortcomings. Significant shortcomings included the following: (1) fragmentation of the appropriations process, (2) unbalance in Presidential and Congressional resources and support functions, (3) delays in funding, (4) reprogramming or the use of funds for reasons other than those intended by Congress, (5) a lag between the time when funds were appropriated and when they were spent, (6) "back-door spending" or spending routes other than through bills considered by the appropriations committees, and (7) with the increasing incidents of Presidential impoundment of funds, it became painfully obvious to Congress that it had lost control of the budget.

With the passage of Public Law 92-599 on October 27, 1972, Congress established a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control and directed it to study the above weaknesses in the budgetary process [Ref. 34, p. 3475]. A major budgetary reform measure, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (signed into law on July 12, 1974), was a result of this Joint Committee study. The two main objectives of this new reform measure were (1) to improve the Congressional budget making process, and (2) to restore to Congress its power of the purse.

#### B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESSING OF DEFENSE BUDGET

Before discussing the reform measures contained in the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, it is desirable in the framework of this study that the reader be familiar with the Congressional budgetary process as related to the Defense Budget prior to the passage of this new Act.

The Defense Budget, which is part of the Presidential Budget submitted to Congress in January of each year, is the result of a formal 18 month effort under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) [Ref. 32]. During this formulation phase of the Defense Budget, there has been a constant dialogue between the President, the Office of Management and Budget, the various Military Services, and Congress concerning program evaluations and budget requests. Congress receives this Defense Budget and through its authorization/appropriation review process can change,

eliminate, or even add new programs not requested by the President. It can increase or decrease the amounts recommended by the President to fund existing and proposed new programs.

Congressional review of the Defense Budget begins with the authorization (approval of programs for which expenditures are to be made) process in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees [Ref. 26]. These committees review those Defense requests subject to the authorization process such as Military Construction; Procurement; Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; and military and civilian personnel end strengths. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees conduct separate hearings on the Defense Budget during which posture statements presented by witnesses from the various Services are reviewed. Each committee holds markup sessions in which any changes to the Defense Budget request are made. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees then draft separate authorization bills and submit them to the respective House and Senate for floor action and passage. Any disagreements in the two bills are resolved by a joint conference committee composed of members from the House and Senate. After final passage by both houses and signing by the President, the Defense Authorization Act is submitted to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, specifically the Appropriations Subcommittees on the Department of Defense, for use in their review of appropriations requests.

The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense deal with the appropriation (providing funds for the programs approved by authorization) process [Ref. 26]. In actual practice the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees commence hearings on the Defense Budget similar to those conducted by the Armed Services Committees prior to receipt of the Authorization Act. The Appropriations Subcommittees also review Defense appropriations that do not require authorization. The sequence of events followed in the appropriation process parallels that observed in the authorization process. After hearings and markup sessions are completed, a Defense Appropriation Bill is drafted and passed by each house. Any differences in the two bills are again resolved in a joint conference committee. The appropriation process ends with final approval of the Conference Report by both houses and signing by the President. The final Department of Defense Appropriation Bill provides for new obligational authority (NOA) for each budget request. This NOA authorizes the Department of Defense to sign contracts for the amount of the NOA at any time during the obligational period associated with the budget category.

Since Congress normally receives the Defense Budget request in late January, it has had only a little over five months in which to complete its authorization/appropriation process before the start of the new fiscal year in July. A problem with Congress' budget procedure in the past has been its inability to complete action on approval and

spending measures by the time the fiscal year begins. The following tables illustrate the delays in passage of the Defense Authorization Acts and Appropriation Bills for the fiscal years 1969 through 1975 [Ref. 10, pp. 13-14].

Dates of Passage of the Defense Authorization Acts

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Date of Passage</u>
1975	5 August 1974
1974	16 November 1973
1973	26 September 1972
1972	17 November 1971
1971	7 October 1970
1970	19 November 1969
1969	20 September 1968

Table 1

Dates of Passage of the Defense Appropriation Bills

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Date of Passage</u>
1975	8 October 1974
1974	2 January 1974
1973	26 October 1972
1972	18 December 1971
1971	11 January 1971
1970	29 December 1969
1969	17 October 1968

Table 2

As may be noted, the dates of passage in each case occurred well after the start of the new fiscal year on 1 July. It was therefore necessary that the Defense

Department operate under continuing resolutions. The problem with this method of funding is that dollars are being spent on programs that may not be approved, or that may be approved at lesser levels thereby adversely affecting the planned spending rates. This is just another incident of Congress' lack of desired control over the budget. This, along with the other budgetary shortcomings mentioned earlier, led to the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

#### C. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974

Senator Charles H. Percy in reference to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 stated:

"The budget reform legislation represents one of those historic turning points in the evolution of our institution, a reversal of the accelerating erosion of the congressional power of the purse, a reassertion of our correct role in the American plan of government" [Ref. 15, p. 734].

This Act was indeed the most innovative budget reform measure initiated by Congress since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. It is not the intent of this study to analyze or describe in detail all the provisions of this Act. This section will merely list the major changes to the Congressional budget process to provide the reader with a better understanding of the existing environment in which this study attempted to explain Congressional decisions affecting the Defense Budget.

One of the major provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was the establishment of

new Budget Committees in the House and Senate with responsibility for overseeing the entire budget making process [Ref. 7]. The Budget Committees were not created to diminish in any way the responsibilities or prerogatives of other committees. Neither do they eliminate nor reduce the importance of existing procedures for authorization of programs or appropriation of funds. They were created to perform new tasks related to establishing fiscal policy and priorities, and in so doing, facilitate and complement the functions of the existing committees. Included in the responsibilities of the Budget Committees are (1) formulating and reporting budget resolutions to their respective houses and (2) recommending appropriate levels of federal revenues, expenditures and debt service to include proposed increases and decreases [Ref. 19, p. 7].

A second important provision was the creation of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [Ref. 7]. When Congress enacted the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, it provided the President with a powerful analytical and budget formulation capability, the Office of Management and Budget, but made no provision for a counterbalance in Congress. The CBO was designed to become that counterbalance. The primary duty of the CBO is to assist the Budget Committees by providing information, data, and analyses. Assistance in budgetary and budget related matters will be provided to other committees upon request [Ref. 19, p. 7].

As was noted earlier, Congress has historically failed to pass appropriation bills on time, and government agencies have had to operate on continuing resolutions. In an attempt to eliminate problems associated with this type of situation, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 changed the fiscal year and established a new Congressional budget schedule with specific milestone dates and actions [Ref. 7]. Effective in fiscal year 1977, the fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September. There was a three month transition period from 1 July 1976 through 30 September 1976 to accomodate the shift from the old to new fiscal year period. The new Congressional budget timetable is as follows [Ref. 19, pp. 7-8):

On or Before

Action to be Completed

10 November

President submits current services budget. This is a projection of the monetary requirements of the Federal Government for the next fiscal year assuming that all existing programs continue at the same level and new programs are not initiated.

15th day after  
Congress meets

President submits his budget.

15 March

Committees and joint committees submit reports to Budget Committees.

1 April

Congresional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees.



15 April	Budget Committees present first concurrent resolutions on the budget to their houses.
15 May	Committees present bills and resolutions authorizing new budget authority. Authorization bills are presented to each house.
15 May	Congress completes action on first concurrent resolution on the budget.
7th day after Labor Day	Congress completes action on bills and resolutions providing new budget authority. Congress must approve the appropriation bills by this date.
15 September	Congress completes action on second required concurrent resolution on the budget. Congress approves final budget.
25 September	Congress completes action on reconciliation bill or resolution, or both, implementing second required concurrent resolution.
1 October	Fiscal year begins.

With the purpose of further strengthening Congress' control over the budgetary process, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 contains several other sections that will not be discussed here such as (1) additional provisions to improve fiscal procedures, (2) amendments to Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, (3) program review and evaluation, (4) fiscal and budgetary information and controls, and (5) impoundment control [Ref. 7].

## D. SURVEY OF LITERATURE

### 1. Various Research Techniques

Congress is obviously a complex organization as can be seen from only a cursory examination of the multitude of documents it publishes and from the volume of research that has been conducted on this institution. Numerous studies have been made in an attempt to analyze and categorize Congressional budgetary decisions in defense as well as non-defense areas. These studies have included elaborate statistical methods, sociological characteristics, personal interviews, comparative analysis and other quantitative techniques. Individual committees as well as the entire Congress have been examined to determine their impact on spending. A review of some of the studies done at the Naval Postgraduate School as part of the Congressional Research Project follow.

In 1973 Joseph G. Terry, Jr. developed a methodology for analyzing Congressional decision making based on the then current Department of Defense (DOD) budgetary process [Ref. 31]. He suggested four linear, stochastic models for testing Congressional decisions toward DOD budget requests. These models were tested via a cross-sectional regression analysis for Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in the 1970 - 1973 timeframe. Terry's results employed the idea of a game theoretic approach to DOD budgeting where both DOD and Congress act like opponents in

a two-player game and adjust their requests and appropriations based on observation of each other's behavior.

James R. Capra's Ph.D. dissertation, published in 1974, is an intensive characterization of Congressional appropriations for Defense Procurement and Research and Development between 1953 and 1973 [Ref. 6]. In addition to studying a longer time period, he used wider statistical methods. His approach involved formulating alternative models of appropriations as a percentage of requests and deriving point and interval estimates for parameters using robust statistical procedures. He concluded that decisions of Congress affecting Procurement and Research and Development changed considerably, starting in fiscal year 1969. Following the lead of Terry and Capra, Stephen C. Wood in 1975 provided a detailed chronology of the Defense Budget cycle with emphasis placed on the different roles played by the Service branches, DOD, and Congress [Ref. 61]. He studied DOD budgetary data for fiscal years 1953 - 1971 and again used statistical linear regression analysis to evaluate Congressional decision processes.

Robert C. Berry and Danial E. Peckham departed from the statistical analysis approach in their 1975 study of Congressional committee decisions and interactions between Navy Program Managers [Ref. 3]. Their research was based on telephone and written surveys, personal interviews with Congressmen, Congressional staff members, Navy Program

Managers and other DOD personnel. Significant among their findings were that the Armed Services Committees are becoming quite expert in weaponry and individual weapon systems and that Congressional committee staff work has a strong influence on decisions reached in the various committees. A defense-oriented roll-call vote technique was employed by Charles M. Rankin in 1973 [Ref. 27]. He used similarity observations between 20 Senate defense votes during the period 1969-1971 as inputs to a multi-dimensional scaling computer program. The scaling solutions resulting from this program showed that the most important dimensions in explaining pro-defense voting were non-partisan/partisan and foreign policy/domestic policy.

## 2. Fiscal/Programmatic Studies

A predominant theme running throughout the majority of studies reviewed was whether Congress makes its budgetary decisions on a purely fiscal basis or on a broader policy or programmatic basis. Although most studies have supported the fiscal hypothesis, there is some disagreement among analysts in regard to Congress' fiscal/programmatic nature. Richard F. Fenno, Jr. in the comprehensive work, The Power of the Purse, concentrated his study toward the Congressional decisions made on the budgets of seven major non-defense departments of the U.S. Government during the 16 year period, 1947 to 1962 [Ref. 13]. All decisions analyzed were decisions made regarding the original appropriations request. Although he found that the dominant concern of

agency officials were programmatic, Congressional decisions were made on a more fiscal or incremental pattern of non-defense spending.

In his book, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Aaron Wildavsky states that "Budgeting is treated as if it were non-programmatic. Most committees view their work as marginal, monetary adjustments to existing programs so that the question of the ultimate desirability of most programs arises only once in a while" [Ref. 59, p. 101]. Wildavsky agrees with Fenno that Congress makes budget decisions on an incremental, fiscal basis.

The research team of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky give further support to the fiscal hypothesis in their article, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process" [Ref. 11]. They studied 56 non-defense agencies of the U.S. Government during 1947 to 1963 in an attempt to establish a mathematical model which would accurately predict the outcomes of the Congressional budgetary process for each agency. Their research led them to believe that Congressional decisions can be represented by simple models which are stable over periods of time, linear, and stochastic. They concluded that the budgetary process has been based on incrementalism and has been non-programmatic in nature.

Arnold Kanter, an advocate of the programmatic hypothesis, has stated that even though most studies of the budgetary process in non-defense areas have concluded that Congress' orientation to appropriations is essentially

non-programmatic, it can not be automatically inferred that Congress is disinclined to use its power over the Defense Budget as an instrument to shape programs and policies. Kanter's evaluation of Congress and the Defense Budget during the period 1960 to 1970 concentrated on the authorization/appropriation processes [Ref. 18]. His findings demonstrated that Congressional activity among the disaggregated budget categories indicates a programmatic orientation toward the Defense Budget. He further concluded that Congress is concerned about more than how much money is spent and has evidenced a willingness and desire to influence the nation's defense requirements as well as the content of national security policy. An interesting illustration given by Kanter portrays the programmatic thinking of Congress:

"Budget reductions also have been explained in terms of the Congress's understanding of the requirements of national security. Senator Richard Russell articulated his uneasiness about procuring the fast deployment logistics (FDL) ships requested by the Johnson Administration: 'If we build anything like this, we are just going to be handed more and more of this business of fighting everybody's wars everywhere.' The belief that an increased ability to intervene would result in greater U.S. intervention abroad contributed to Congress's regular refusal to fund the FDL's" [Ref. 18, pp. 136-137].

Arnold Kanter feels that the programmatic nature of Congress will have the "greatest potential significance for defense policy" [Ref. 18, p. 142].

In an attempt to resolve the fiscal/programmatic question, Lawrence J. Korb studied the Congressional impact upon the Defense Budget from fiscal years 1962 to 1973

[Ref. 21]. His analysis dealt with new obligational authority in four major appropriation categories:

(1) Personnel, (2) Operations and Maintenance, (3) Procurement, and (4) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. Although admitting that the fiscal/programmatic question is not easily answered, Korb concluded that Congressional motivations in the Defense area are mostly fiscal.

Edward A. Kolodziej in his book, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945 - 1963, investigated Congress' use of its power of the purse to influence military force levels, weapons systems, and strategic policy [Ref. 20]. He describes how Congress has participated in shaping defense policy and analyzes and evaluates the actual decisions of Congress as they applied to the annual Defense Budget. He based his studies primarily on the open record of Congress as contained in the hearings, reports and floor debates on the annual Defense appropriation bills. Kolodziej was quite critical of Congress and argued that it should assume a more positive, active, and informed role in strategic policy, and, accordingly, that the effectiveness of U.S. strategic and foreign policies could be improved. Kolodziej stated that the decentralization and diffusion of power and responsibility in Congress created a set of incentives that oriented individual Congressmen and the Defense appropriations committees away from a full programmatic review of the Defense Budget. He claimed that most members were induced, first of all, to choose the time honored rule of watchdog (fiscal

hypothesis) of the public purse. Kolodziej further criticized the fiscal approach of Congress to the Defense appropriation bill by stating that Congress had found itself out of joint with the requirements of policy that are attuned to the nation's strategic imperatives and that Congress had been slow to perceive the rapid social, political, economic and technological changes occurring in the world. He called for Congressional budgetary reform that would lead to a redistribution of power and responsibility in Congress and that would create a system of incentives which would encourage a review and determination of the Defense Budget in terms of (1) the policy goals that it seeks to achieve, (2) its military and economic feasibility, (3) its fiscal implications, and (4) its relation to other strategic and non-strategic programs [Ref. 20, p. 529].

In his article based on 100 interviews, primarily with members of Congressional committees having military responsibility, and other leading Congressmen, a few committee staff members, administrative assistants, and legislative liaison personnel from the Defense Department, Lewis A. Dexter provides many interesting quotes that indicate Congressional decisions lean more toward the fiscal hypothesis than the programmatic [Ref. 12]. Dexter states that Congressmen interviewed generally indicated that they were not inclined to raise or consider questions of military policy in terms of its meaning for some national or international political objective or goal (It should be noted



that Dexter conducted his interviews in the years prior to 1969). In referring to military policy, Dexter meant decisions dealing with the relationship of weapons, personnel, organization, and administration to foreign policy, national interests and purposes and societal values and objectives. Some of his more revealing quotes include:

"In fact how do we (committee) members know what should be considered? We mostly reflect what the military people recommend; military policy is made by the Department of Defense" [Ref. 12, p. 376].

"We don't have a lot before our (Armed Services) committee. There's really much scarcity of policy legislation ... Maybe we have given too much authority to the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress itself has promulgated legislation which says to them - use your own judgment" [Ref. 12, p. 380].

"The Appropriations Committee is concerned mainly not so much with legislation as avoiding accountable waste. As to getting into the policy field, there its members have no clear viewpoint of whether they should or should not" [Ref. 12, p. 381].

Edward J. Laurance has done extensive work on the changing role of Congress in the Defense decision-making process [Refs. 24 & 25]. His findings indicate that Congress has become increasingly more concerned with Defense policy, particularly since 1968, which would suggest a programmatic orientation.

### 3. Studies Utilizing Content Analysis

Several studies have employed the technique of Content Analysis to determine patterns of Congressional budgetary decision making. Ira Sharkansky used Content

Analysis to evaluate the relationship of a House Appropriations Subcommittee toward four non-defense agencies which came under its jurisdiction [Ref. 29]. His primary objective was to determine how the subcommittee divided its supervisory and control efforts among the four agencies and how this affected the budget requests submitted by the agencies. He based his analysis on subcommittee hearings, subcommittee reports, and agency budget requests over a span of years from 1949 to 1963. His unit of analysis was the questions asked of agency officials by subcommittee members during the hearings. These questions were coded into certain categories depending on their subject matter. Sharkansky found that the subcommittee members often relied on the agency officials to provide cues during the hearings about items worthy of questioning. Stating that his study provided a systematic collection of data about the behavior of an Appropriations Subcommittee, Sharkansky concluded that the subcommittee members did indeed vary their oversight activity among the agencies. He found that the subcommittee "devoted more than the average amount of supervision and control efforts to the agencies that spend the most money, whose requests have increased the most rapidly, and whose behavior toward the subcommittee has deviated most frequently from subcommittee desires" [Ref. 29, p. 628]. Sharkansky further indicated that his study had shown the practicality of using Content Analysis of appropriations hearings to devise indexes

of committee behavior and that this method could have wider application in a systematic study of legislative-executive relations.

James E. Jernberg also used Content Analysis to study the interaction between several House Appropriations Subcommittees and five non-defense agencies under their control [Ref. 17]. His investigation sought to determine whether there was a relationship between the use of program terms in the presentation of budgets and supplementary information and the types of questions asked of agency representatives during the hearings. Jernberg stated that it would seem reasonable to expect that the types of questions asked by a committee would reflect their information orientation. The questions asked were originally coded into 37 categories, later reduced to four major categories: Program, Objects of Expenditure, Oversight of Administration, and Other. Jernberg concluded that, "the primary purpose of the appropriations hearings is to serve the subcommittee's search for confidence in the agency and in their own pre-dispositions. The subcommittee's need is to feel assured that either the amount requested is the appropriate amount to be granted, or that their previous patterns of behavior, (e.g. cut a little, grant request, or increase request) should prevail" [Ref. 17, p. 111].

Using the technique of Content Analysis, Leo A. Lukenas analyzed the actions of the House Appropriations Committee in the area of Defense Procurement budget requests

during the period fiscal years 1970 through 1973 [Ref. 23]. Lukenas characterized the activity of the committee on the basis of the reasons given for its decisions on the individual line item elements of the Defense Procurement appropriation. The justification given for particular committee decisions were identified and assigned to one of seven categories of reasons. Lukenas' categories included: (1) Improper request, (2) Service adjustment, (3) Reduced requirement, (4) Financial adjustment, (5) Special subcommittee action, (6) No reason cited, and (7) Conformance with authorization. Lukenas concluded that most House Appropriations Committee decisions dealing with Defense Procurement during the period studied were fiscal in nature rather than programmatic. He also noted that the role played by the "Authorization Committees" seemed to show an increasingly more important impact on the budgetary process.

Larry W. Blackmon applied Content Analysis to a greater extent than did Lukenas in his evaluation of the budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Services Committee toward Defense Procurement in the fiscal year 1968 - 1974 timeframe [Ref. 4]. His purpose was to determine whether the Senate Armed Services Committee behaves in a fiscal manner - directing its efforts at improving defense management or efficiency, or whether it behaves in a programmatic manner - trying to shape the nation's defense policy. Like Lukenas, Blackmon chose the decision for budget changes as the unit of analysis most appropriate for coding in the

committee budgetary process. Committee reports were examined and the decisions given were ultimately placed into one of three major categories: (1) Programmatic, (2) Fiscal, or (3) Other. In summarizing his findings, Blackmon stated that the predominant behavior pattern of the committee appeared to be fiscal in nature, but that the overall trend of programmatic activity was one of a steadily increasing nature. He found that although the number of fiscal actions exceeded those of a programmatic nature by a factor of three, the absolute dollar value of the fiscal actions was 60% less [Ref. 4, pp. 39 & 43]. Blackmon also noted that Content Analysis had demonstrated to be a useful tool in determining the behavior of a specific committee and could prove to have wide applicability.

### III. CONTENT ANALYSIS

The following synopsis of Content Analysis (CA) was taken from Berelson [Ref. 2], Holsti [Ref. 16], and Lasswell, Leites and associates [Ref. 22].

#### A. DEFINITION

Content Analysis as a research design is a plan for collecting and analyzing data in order to answer an investigator's questions. A good CA research design develops explicit procedures for selecting a sample of data for analysis, content categories and units to be placed into the categories, comparisons between categories, and the classes of inference which may be drawn from the data. In short, a good CA design ensures that theory, data gathering, analysis, and interpretation are integrated. Other definitions of CA include the following:

"Content Analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis of inference" [Ref. 16, p. 2].

"Content Analysis is the statistical semantics of political discourse" [Ref. 16, p. 2].

"Content Analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications" [Ref. 2, p. 18].

#### B. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

When applying CA to a research problem, several assumptions must be made. These include: (1) CA assumes that

inferences about the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect can validly be made. (2) CA assumes that study of the manifest content is meaningful. The content analyst assumes that the "meanings" which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain categories, corresponds to the "meanings" intended by the communicator and are understood by the audience. (3) CA assumes that the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. This implies that the frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process [Ref. 2, pp. 18-20].

The need for a clearly formulated problem and for fully stated, dependent hypotheses is essential. In CA relatively few ideas are discovered in the actual process of analysis. The hit-or-miss method of analyzing "everything" in a body of content in the hope that "something will turn up" is seldom productive, and is certainly uneconomical since CA can be a time consuming process. If the problem is not clarified to the point where several worthwhile hypotheses or questions can be formulated, then the projected analysis should be abandoned.

#### C. DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

The two criteria of objectivity and a systematic approach imply that the investigator use well thought out rules and procedures. The use of an explicit set of rules minimizes

the possibility that the findings reflect the analyst's subjective predispositions rather than the content of the documents being studied. A systematic approach eliminates analyses in which only materials supporting the investigator's hypotheses are admitted as evidence. To distinguish it from simple information indexing, CA must have theoretical relevance. All CA is concerned with comparison, the type of comparison being dictated by the investigator's theory. Content Analysis should also be quantitative. More impressive results can be drawn if CA yields numerical data.

Content Analysis proves useful when data accessibility is a problem and the investigator's data are limited to documentary evidence or when restrictions of time and space do not permit direct access to the subjects of research. The analyst must be careful of his own intuition when using CA. While intuition may be important in some stages of research, especially in formulating the problem, it is not a substitute for objectivity or for the evidence present. Content Analysis will be useful whenever the problem requires precise and replicable methods for analyzing those attributes of documents which may escape casual scrutiny.

In a CA framework, all communication is composed of six basic elements: a source or sender, an encoding process which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient of the message, and a decoding process. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of these six elements [Ref. 16, p. 25].



# CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THE COMMUNICATIONS PARADIGM




Figure 1.

Content Analysis is used most frequently to describe the attributes of messages. The investigator may compare documents derived from a single source in several ways including a comparison of messages over time, across different audiences or in different situations. Theories may also be tested by comparing the messages produced by two or more different sources. Usually the purpose is to relate theoretically significant attributes of communication to differences in the messages they produce.

Coding in CA is the process whereby raw data are systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise descriptions of relevant content characteristics. The rules by which this transformation is accomplished serve as the operational link between the investigator's data and his theory and hypothesis. Coding rules are thus a central part of the research design.

As equally important as coding rules are the categories into which the data is coded. Choice of categories, units of analysis, and systems of enumeration represent three interrelated decisions which every content analyst must make in light of his specific research problem. There is something of a progression in the design of CA. The hypotheses derive from the nature of the problem and in a sense help to refine it. The general categories for analysis are contained in the hypotheses and they in turn are translated into concrete, specific indicators for purposes of the actual analysis. The actual results are then generalized

and applied to the level of the categories and thus constitute a test of the hypotheses under investigation.

Content Analysis succeeds or fails based on its categories. Some general principles of category construction include the following: (1) The most important requirement of categories is that they must adequately reflect the investigator's research question. The analyst must define clearly the variables he is dealing with and he must specify the indicators which determine whether a given content datum falls within the category. The analyst must decide on how fine are the distinctions he wishes to make within categories. Subdivisions within categories permit the analyst to make more comparisons. (2) The second general requirement — that categories be exhaustive — means that all relevant items in the sample of documents under study must be capable of being placed into a category. (3) The requirement of mutual exclusiveness stipulates that no content datum can be placed in more than a single category. (4) Independence of categories means that assignment of any datum into a category not affect the classification of other data. (5) The rule that each category must be derived from a single classification principle stipulates that conceptually different levels of analysis must be kept separate.

If possible categories should be standardized. The advantages of standardization are the same as in any area of scholarship, namely that results may be compared across

studies and findings will tend to become cumulative. In the absence of standard schemes of classification, the analyst is usually faced with the task of constructing appropriate categories by trial and error methods. This process consists of moving back and forth from theory to data, testing the usefulness of tentative categories, and then modifying them in light of the data. Among the types of categories used frequently in CA research are the following examples: subject matter (most frequently used), direction, standards, values, ends and means, traits, and verbal interaction.

In addition to defining the categories, the analyst must designate the recording units of analysis that will be placed in a given category. Almost all CA studies have used one of five units: (1) The single word or symbol is generally the smallest unit that has been used. (2) The theme, a single assertion about some subject, is the most useful unit of CA. (3) The central character as recording unit has been used in studies of fiction, drama, movies, etc. (4) Sentence or paragraph structure has only been used sparingly. (5) The item is usually too broad a unit for most studies and has only been used occasionally.

In deciding how to analyze his data and findings, the analyst must also choose the system of enumeration he will use. The most widely used method of measuring characteristics of content is frequency, in which every occurrence of a given attitude is tallied.

Two other criteria of CA must be present — reliability and validity. If research is to satisfy the requirement of objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable, i.e. repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results. Opportunities for enhancing reliability in CA are generally restricted to improving categories. Category reliability depends upon the analyst's ability to formulate categories "for which the empirical evidence is clear enough so that competent judges will agree to a sufficiently high degree on which items of a certain population belong in the category and which do not" [Ref. 16, p. 136]. A solution to the problem of low reliability is the introduction of additional judges to broaden the base of consensus. Validity is usually defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring what it is supposed to measure. Choice of categories and content units similarly enhance or diminish the likelihood of valid inferences about the data.

Also, most CA studies cannot escape making sampling decisions. Often the abundance of material is great and the analyst is restricted by time — he either obtains his data by sampling or does not obtain it at all.

Content Analysis has proved to be a valuable research method in many areas of inquiry, however, three disciplines have accounted for approximately 75% of all CA research: Sociology-Anthropology (27.7%), General Communication (25.9%) and Political Science (21.5%) [Ref. 16, p. 21].

#### IV. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

##### A. METHODOLOGY

As stated in the introductory chapter, the main purpose of this thesis was to determine the fiscal/programmatic orientation of Congress through an analysis of the Congressional budgetary decisions affecting the Defense Budget. The Congressional committees having the most direct impact on the Defense Budget and the committees evaluated were: the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Department of Defense, and the House and Senate Committees on the Budget. The various Conference Committees of the House and Senate involved in the budgetary process were also included in the analysis. The specific portions of the Defense Budget chosen for evaluation were Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). This study was limited to an analysis of the fiscal year 1976 and fiscal year 1977 Defense Budgets, the first two years covered by the new Congressional budgetary process as prescribed by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The research technique employed was Content Analysis as defined and described in Chapter III. The methodology also built on that used by Lukenas and Blackmon [Refs. 23 & 4]. The specific steps followed were: (1) identification of documentary material that represent an accurate, explicit

indication of committee behavior, (2) isolation of some unit of analysis that can be categorized for further analysis, (3) development of appropriate categories for use with the unit of analysis, (4) coding and verification of categories, and (5) inferences based on the above processes [Ref. 4]. Also included in the methodology were the six basic elements of communication as described by Holsti: a source or sender, an encoding process which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient of the message, and a decoding process [Ref. 16].

#### B. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

The primary data sources used for analysis were the published Reports of the House, Senate, and Conference Committees on Armed Services [Refs. 38 through 40], and the Reports of the House, Senate, and Conference Committees on Appropriations for the Department of Defense [Refs. 41 through 46]. In the case of the House and Senate Budget Committees, the documents evaluated were the First and Second Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget [Refs. 47 through 58].

The Reports and Resolutions, which are published after the various committees hold hearings, conferences, and markup sessions, are excellent summaries of the major actions taken and decisions made by the committees. Both the Reports and Resolutions are available to anyone with access to an official government depository such as the library of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Supplemental data sources included the Congressional Quarterly Almanac [Ref. 8] and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports [Ref. 9].

#### C. UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND DATA RECORDING

After obtaining all documentary material, the next step in the methodology was to isolate and record some unit of analysis that could be further categorized and evaluated. The research of Lukenas and Blackmon [Refs. 23 & 4] demonstrated that an appropriate unit of analysis was the "reasons given for committee decisions on individual line items." After an initial preview of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee Reports, it was decided to continue with this unit of analysis. A somewhat different approach had to be taken in evaluating the Resolutions of the Budget Committees. This approach will be described in the Summary of Findings chapter.

An indepth analysis of the Reports for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 was undertaken, and the committee decision for each individual weapon system or program (e.g. Condor Missile, B-1 Bomber, Nuclear Strike Cruiser, XM-204 Howitzer, etc.) contained in the Procurement and RDT&E appropriation titles was recorded. A committee decision was defined to be the reason given for: (1) recommending full approval of funds requested, (2) changes in dollar amounts (+ and -) requested, (3) the deletion of an entire program, or (4) the occasional



restoration by the Senate Appropriations Committee of funds cut by the House Appropriations Committee.

The individual recording of committee decisions was a time consuming process, but necessary for this type analysis. In all 829 committee decisions were recorded on worksheets. The decisions were separated on the worksheets by committee and Procurement and RDT&E. It would be impractical to list all 829 decisions here; however, several typical decisions and the worksheet format used are illustrated in Appendix A. Even though the worksheet includes the particular Service and the dollar amounts involved, no attempt was made to determine the most or least affected Service in a monetary sense.

#### D. CATEGORY DEVELOPMENT

The next step, and probably the most important, was the development of categories in which to place the units of analysis. The basic problem in the thesis was to determine if the various committees' actions affecting the Defense Budget were fiscal or programmatic in nature. Therefore, the working hypotheses or final categories became Fiscal and Programmatic. The fundamental definition and structure for these two categories was taken from Korb [Ref. 21].

After recording and evaluating the committee decisions, 14 original or subcategories were developed. During this subcategory development, particular attention was given to key words and phrases contained in the content of the committee's decision.

The final categories with their subcategories were defined as follows:

1. Fiscal Category

This category included those decisions that reflected committee efforts to eliminate waste and inefficiencies. The primary concern of the committee was to reduce Defense spending and this was often accomplished with percentage or across-the-board reductions. There was very little concern expressed for overall Defense policy or program composition.

a. Cost

This subcategory included those systems that the committee considered to be not cost effective or economical. Key words and phrases were "costly", "expensive", "system worth not equal to funds expended", "inexplainable costs", "cost growth", "cost overruns", "government and contractor cost estimates different." The committee was concerned with eliminating wastes and excessive expenditures by prohibiting duplication of programs. The committee felt that a reduced funding level would be adequate.

b. Improper Request

This subcategory included requests that the committee felt were under the wrong title or line item. The committee could not determine a need or requirement for the funds requested. The requested percentage increase was too large in the committee's opinion. The committee

felt that it was improper to buy a new piece of equipment when a present one could be modified at a lower cost. The committee considered that funds requested were not required at this time since the system would not be procured until a subsequent fiscal year - reductions in this case were an attempt to reduce undesirable reprogramming actions. The committee determined that funds from a previous year had not been used and should be expended before more funds were approved.

c. Program Management

The committee felt that the management of the program contributed to waste and inefficient use of funds; consequently, a reduction was in order. The committee believed that better management would result in a more favorable price, cost, etc.

2. Programmatic Category

This category included those decisions that reflected committee efforts to shape Defense programs and specific weapons systems to conform to desired committee policies, goals, and directions concerning National Defense. The committee was less concerned with total spending and more concerned with strengthening the force structure, determining the types and numbers of weapons systems, increasing capabilities, improving technology, etc.

a. Force Structure/Effectiveness

This subcategory included those committee decisions that expressed a concern for force level, structure,

effectiveness and readiness posture. Committee actions were often an attempt to influence particular inventory levels.

b. Force Modernization

The committee was genuinely concerned with force modernization and demonstrated an expressed desire for technically improving equipment considered obsolete or inadequate to meet a threat.

c. Developmental

Actions under this subcategory were an attempt by the committee to be able to make a decision based on a firm, unquestionable system; the committee wanted to be certain as to what kind of system it was buying. Key words and phrases included "premature request", "development incomplete", "further study, testing, design, operational evaluation, etc. needed", "schedule slippages due to technical/developmental problems." The decision contained a committee preference as to system characteristics, specifications, engine manufacturer, type, etc.

d. Planning/Justification

The committee felt that the planned use for the system was incorrect. Also the Service had presented no or inadequate justification for the system. The expressed committee concern under this subcategory was for the system/program itself, not the funds requested. The committee felt there was no requirement or need for the system.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This subcategory was originally included under the Fiscal category but later changed to Programmatic after a verification process.

e. Tactical Program

The committee felt that the system was needed to strengthen tactical capabilities. Committee decisions were motivated by the requirement to meet an opposing tactical threat. Often the committee stated that another system would satisfy the tactical requirement better than the system for which funds were requested.

f. Strategic Program

Reasons given for decisions under this subcategory were very similar to the tactical subcategory only referred to as strategic in nature. Committee actions were attempts to improve strategic programs or strengthen strategic capabilities. Several decisions were concerned specifically with affecting the strategic Triad: Missile Submarines, Bombers, and ICBM's.

g. Foreign Policy

The committee expressed a concern for the affects of Defense policy on international treaties, commitments, alliances and the perceived role of U.S. forces on the world scene. The committee desired to maintain an independent U. S. technological base regardless of NATO actions. Even though Congress supported NATO alliances, the committee would not approve actions that adversely affected U. S. Defense posture and capabilities.

h. Congressional Policy

The committee decision contained words directing that a particular Congressional procedure, policy, plan be

followed. The request for funds was in direct violation of an expressed policy of Congress.

### 3. Other Category

After recording all the committee decisions, it was determined that a third final category would be needed. Decisions in this category did not appear to represent true committee initiatives. This category was termed "Other" and included three subcategories.

#### a. Department of Defense Action

The committee's decision (usually reduction of funds or cancellation of program) was identical to some previous action taken or request made by DOD or one of the Services.

#### b. Conforms to Authorization

This subcategory applied to the Appropriations Committees. It was not possible to determine the House/ Senate Appropriations Committee fiscal/programmatic direction when the only reason given was "amount recommended conforms to authorization."

#### c. No Reason

Decisions were assigned to this subcategory when no reason was given or it was impossible to determine the committee's fiscal/programmatic nature. Blackmon [Ref. 4] in his analysis of the Senate Armed Services Committee assumed a "worst case" and if no reason for a decision was given, it was coded as fiscal. Contrary to Blackmon and in order to prevent any personal bias from entering the analysis,

this study coded "no reason" decisions under the Other category.

Figure 2 illustrates the three final categories with their subcategories and the abbreviations used for coding.

#### E. CODING AND VERIFICATION OF CATEGORIES

The next step in the methodology was to code the units of analysis (committee decisions) using the subcategories and final categories developed. Initially the decisions given by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the Procurement and RDT&E titles for fiscal year 1976 were assigned to one of the original 14 subcategories.<sup>2</sup> Before proceeding with the coding of the remaining committee decisions, it was felt that the reliability and validity of the categories should be tested. This was accomplished through a verification process.

A Category Verification sheet was prepared which included a brief synopsis of the fiscal/programmatic hypotheses and 25 typical committee decisions. Seven persons disassociated with the analysis were briefed on the objective of the study, Content Analysis technique and the fiscal/programmatic hypotheses. These seven persons or independent judges were then given a verification sheet and asked to code the decisions as fiscal or programmatic.

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<sup>2</sup>Appendix A also illustrates the coding process used on the worksheets.

# CATEGORIES

<u>F - Fiscal</u>		<u>P - Programmatic</u>	<u>O - Other</u>
1. CT - Cost	1. FS/E - Force Structure/ Effectiveness	1. DOD - Department of Defense Action	
2. IR - Improper Request	2. FM - Force Modernization	2. CA - Conforms to Authorization	
3. PM - Program Management	3. DEV - Developmental	3. NR - No Reason	
	4. P/J - Planning Justification		
	5. TP - Tactical Program		
	6. SP - Strategic Program		
	7. FP - Foreign Policy		
	8. CP - Congressional Policy		

Figure 2.



For 20 out of 25 or 80% of the decisions there was total agreement between the author's original coding and the seven independent judges. For one of the decisions, five judges agreed with the original coding and two disagreed. On another of the decisions, six judges agreed with the original coding with only one in disagreement. The coding of these two decisions was considered to be in sufficient agreement with the original coding for the purposes of this study. This brought the total agreement in coding to 22 out of 25 decisions or 88%.

An interesting thing occurred on the other three decisions. For two of these decisions, six of the judges disagreed with the original coding and one agreed. On the third decision, all seven judges disagreed with the original coding. These three decisions involved committee statements as to the justification, planning, need, or purpose for a system or program. Decisions such as these had originally been coded by the author as Fiscal under the Planning/Justification subcategory. The verification process had indicated that a majority of independent judges considered these decisions to be Programmatic in nature. The original coding of these decisions was therefore changed from Fiscal to Programmatic.

Upon completion of the verification process, it was felt that the reliability and validity of the categories had been proven sufficiently enough to code the remaining recorded decisions on the worksheets.

Appendix B illustrates the Verification Sheet format with the original coding, coding by the seven independent judges, and final coding of the 25 sample decisions.

## V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### A. FRAMEWORK FOR DISPLAY

In order to draw inferences from the recorded decisions, some system of enumeration and display had to be developed. A table was prepared for each committee displaying the number of decisions coded as fiscal, programmatic, or other by fiscal year (FY) and appropriation title. A bar graph was also prepared for each committee showing the fiscal, programmatic and other categories as a percentage of the total committee decisions.

### B. HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

The format of the House Armed Services Committee Report was well suited for application of the Content Analysis technique. Most of the decisions for the Procurement title were found in sections entitled "Discussion of Major Weapons Procurement Programs" or "Committee Comment On Specific Programs." The FY77 Report had a lengthy discussion of the Navy's Shipbuilding and Conversion programs. The RDT&E sections of the Reports were very well organized. Each individual weapons system or program was followed by paragraphs entitled "Committee Recommendation" and "Basis for Committee Action."

# HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement	6	12	0	18
	RDT&E	21	8	0	29
	Subtotal	27	20	0	47
FY77	Procurement	4	20	0	24
	RDT&E	16	14	0	30
	Subtotal	20	34	0	54
Grandtotal		47	54	0	101

Table 3

The above table indicates that committee decisions regarding the Procurement title were more programmatic in both FY's. For the RDT&E title the committee was clearly more fiscal in FY76 but fairly evenly divided between fiscal/programmatic in FY77. Across both titles, the committee was slightly more fiscal in FY76 and more programmatic in FY77. Overall for the two year period, the committee's orientation was more programmatic by a percentage of 53.5 to 46.5.

Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 3

### C. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

The format of the Senate Armed Services Committee Report was the best of all the committees for applying Content Analysis. Programs under both the Procurement and RDT&E titles were separated by Service (e.g. Army Aircraft, Air Force Missiles, Navy Torpedoes, Army Tracked Combat Vehicles, etc.). Individual line item decisions in the Procurement title were found in sections entitled "Committee Recommendation for Changes." Line items in the RDT&E title contained paragraphs entitled "Committee Recommendations", "Background", "Committee Considerations", and "Basis for Committee Action."

#### SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement	17	16	1	34
	RDT&E	4	21	1	26
	Subtotal	<u>21</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>60</u>
FY77	Procurement	11	13	1	25
	RDT&E	13	21	0	34
	Subtotal	<u>24</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>59</u>
Grandtotal		45	71	3	119

Table 4

This table indicates that committee decisions in the Procurement title were almost evenly divided in both FY's. For RDT&E the committee was more programmatically oriented in each FY. Consequently, the committee displayed an overall programmatic orientation with a percentage of 59.7.

Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 4

D. HOUSE/SENATE ARMED SERVICES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

The Procurement section of the Conference Committee Report followed the format of the Senate Armed Services Committee Report by separating programs according to Service; however, the RDT&E section did not. Neither sections of the Conference Report were as detailed as the individual committee Reports.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement	23	13	7	43
	RDT&E	14	18	3	35
	Subtotal	37	31	10	78
FY77	Procurement	9	17	6	32
	RDT&E	9	21	1	31
	Subtotal	18	38	7	63
Grandtotal		55	69	17	141

Table 5

This table indicates that the Conference Committee decisions regarding the Procurement title were more fiscal in FY76 and more programmatic in FY77. The RDT&E decisions were more programmatic in both years. Across both titles, the committee was more fiscal in FY76 but clearly more programmatic in FY77. Overall the Conference Committee displayed a programmatic orientation which coincided with the findings for the individual committees. More "no reason" decisions were found in the Conference Report than the individual committee Reports. This finding would tend to indicate that the Conference Committee engaged in less discussion and review of programs than the individual committees.

Conference Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 5

#### E. HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

The House Appropriations Committee Report included decisions on many more programs than either of the Armed Services Committee Reports since the Appropriations Committee also approves funds for programs that do not require authorization and review by the Armed Services Committees. Committee decisions in both the Procurement and RDT&E sections of the Report were separated by Service. Most decisions in the Procurement section were found in paragraphs entitled "Committee Recommendations." There was no special paragraph designation in the RDT&E section. The overall orientation of this committee differed from the previous committees, as can be seen in the following table.

#### HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement	31	51	24	106
	RDT&E	62	38	23	123
	Subtotal	93	89	47	229
FY77	Procurement	34	24	3	61
	RDT&E	28	24	6	58
	Subtotal	62	48	9	119
Grandtotal		155	137	56	348

Table 6

The committee displayed more of a programmatic orientation toward the Procurement title in FY76; however, all other committee decisions were more fiscal in nature. Overall



the committee was more fiscal with a percentage of 44.5. It's interesting that the committee did not display even more of a fiscal orientation due to the following statement found in an introductory section of the FY76 Report: "The committee does not recommend changes in the overall defense policies presented by Administration witnesses. The reductions recommended are based on management improvements which the committee feels will both reduce waste and enhance our national security posture" [Ref. 43, p. 9]. Contrary to this statement, the committee did deal with policy issues and demonstrated a fairly strong programmatic nature.

Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 6

#### F. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

The Senate Appropriations Committee Report proved to be very difficult to work with and not well suited to the Content Analysis technique. Very little detail was given

in the Procurement and RDT&E sections concerning committee actions. The few specific reasons given were usually found in an introductory section entitled "Items of Special Interest." The Senate Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY76 and FY77 were reviewed, but very little was found in the Hearings to disclose final committee decisions on specific programs. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports were helpful in determining committee decisions on some major weapons systems. Due to the sketchy information, the Procurement and RDT&E titles are combined in the following table.

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement and RDT&E	2	6	2	10
FY77	Procurement and RDT&E	7	17	1	25
	Grandtotal	9	23	3	35

Table 7

This limited information indicates that the Senate Appropriations Committee was more programmatic in nature.

Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 7

The Senate Appropriations Committee Report for FY76 stated that the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations held 39 separate hearings between February 12, 1975, and October 21, 1975, which produced 14,000 pages of transcript [Ref. 42, p. 10]. Likewise the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY77 began hearings on February 2, 1976, and concluded them on June 24, 1976, after 22 separate sessions producing 15,000 pages of transcript [Ref. 45, p. 8]. From this it would seem that the Senate Appropriations Committee spent a considerable amount of time and effort reviewing the Defense Budget. However, due to the very limited amount of information found in the Reports concerning committee decisions made on individual

programs, one would have to question the actual depth and extent of review to which the Defense Budget was subjected by this committee. As a matter of procedure, final review of the Defense Budget by the Senate Appropriations Committee usually occurs after budget formulation by the House and Senate Budget Committees, authorization action by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and appropriation action by the House Appropriations Committee. It would appear from the data available that the Senate Appropriations Committee has allowed these other committees to take the initiative in making decisions on the Defense Budget and has taken a less active role in scrutinizing budget requests.

Traditionally the Senate Appropriations Committee has acted as an appeals board for agencies which have had their budget requests reduced by the House Appropriations Committee. In both the FY76 and FY77 Reports, the Senate Appropriations Committee complimented the Department of Defense for the prompt manner in which it provided detailed appeals of House actions [Refs. 42 & 45, pp. 13 & 11]. Table 7 above contains 35 individual committee decisions. Twenty-six of these decisions were found in the committee Reports and the nine remaining decisions were obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Of the 26 decisions found in the Reports, eight of these or 31% involved a Senate Appropriations Committee restoration of funds cut by the House Appropriations Committee. It can only be speculated as to how many fewer decisions would have been made by the Senate Appropriations

Committee if there had been no appeal action by the Department of Defense.

G. HOUSE/SENATE APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

There was not much data in the Conference Report with which to determine the fiscal/programmatic orientation of the Conference Committee. For most of the individual programs, the content of the Report merely stated that the conferees had agreed on the House or Senate recommendation or had decided on some mutually acceptable budget amount, but gave no other reason for their decision. This would indicate that most of the Conference Committee decisions were some type of compromising action between the House and Senate Appropriations Committees rather than being primarily fiscal or programmatic in nature.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE DECISIONS

		<u>Category</u>			
		<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY76	Procurement	2	3	20	25
	RDT&E	5	4	22	31
	Subtotal	7	7	42	56
FY77	Procurement	6	5	10	21
	RDT&E	1	3	4	8
	Subtotal	7	8	14	29
Grandtotal		14	15	56	85

Table 8

The above table suggests that for the programs for which a specific reason was given the Conference Committee was evenly divided between fiscal/programmatic. This is logical since the House Committee had been more fiscal and the Senate Committee more programmatic in thinking. The high incident of "no reason" decisions is evident from the relatively large numbers included under the Other category and also from Figure 8. Of the 56 decisions included under the Other category, 41 or 73% of them were coded as no reason. For the remaining 15 decisions in the Other category, the only reason given was that the budgeted amount conformed to authorization. This further suggests that not a great deal of discussion concerning the fiscal/programmatic aspects of most programs occurs during the Conference Committee sessions.

Conference Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 8

#### H. COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET

As was mentioned earlier a different methodology was necessary in analyzing the Budget Committees. The Budget Committees deal with the Federal Budget on an aggregate or macro-economic level. They are concerned with overall federal revenues, deficits, the public debt, and budget authority and outlays. Beginning with the FY77 Federal Budget, the Budget Committees recommended budget amounts for 16 major functional categories such as National Defense, Agriculture, Commerce and Transportation, Health, etc.

The Budget Committees do not break the Defense Budget down into appropriation titles such as Procurement and RDT&E. Neither do they specify recommended amounts for individual weapons systems and programs. Therefore in applying Content Analysis to the Budget Committees, it was not possible to use committee decisions on individual line items as the unit of analysis. After studying the content of the Resolutions, it was decided to record statements and comments found in the Resolutions which would suggest the fiscal/programmatic orientation of the particular committee. This procedure revealed, that in actual practice, the handling of the Defense Budget by the Budget Committees in FY76 and FY77 was more fiscal in nature, but there appears to be a strong potential for a future shift to a more programmatic orientation. Following are sample recorded statements for each committee.

1. House Budget Committee

The following statements suggested a fiscal orientation in reference to National Defense:

"Committee assumes financial adjustments which can be accomplished by use of funds available from prior years accounts, sale of equipment which does not need replacement to foreign governments, adjustment of stock fund balances, reduction in foreign military credit sales, and lower inflation rates than those contained in the President's budget based on latest pricing trends" [Ref. 47, p. 21].

"Reductions in Defense area were mainly for following reasons: (1) there are sufficient funds within the total to support decisions, (2) result of revised inflation estimates, (3) financial adjustments" [Ref. 49, p. 4].

"The Committee recommends an overall reduction in the DOD budget of \$1,324M in budget authority and \$545M in budget outlays. The Committee did not consider individual line items in arriving at this estimate, but rather examined the rates of growth in purchase, inflation rates, and the large and growing unexpended balances currently available to the Department which may become available for transfer under existing procedures from appropriated purposes and used in lieu of new budget authority for funding programs proposed in the budget. To the extent that unobligated balances of prior-year funds cannot be identified in significant amounts during the course of appropriation review, the national defense budget authority totals for fiscal year 1977 may have to be increased above the levels specified herein [Ref. 53, p. 31].

Views of Hon. Robert N. Giaimo

"My views of the situation, therefore, leads me to conclude that in this period of harsh budgetary constraints, the estimates for national defense will be adequate ..." [Ref. 47, p. 78].

"I want to express my concern about the amount of money allocated to the National Defense function. I think it is too high. I am convinced that \$112B in one year is not justified. In my



opinion, we will set in motion a defense procurement rate that will be difficult to curb and control. That, in effect, will result in waste and inefficiency" [Ref. 53, p. 107].

#### Views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman

"This resolution ... would commit the country to a massive and unjustified increase in military spending. This resolution contains wasteful and inefficient programs" [Ref. 53, p. 127].

"Rep. Holtzman complained that the new budget process was more an arithmetical exercise in totting up the requests of the President and actions of appropriations committees than it was a Congressional effort at setting national priorities" [Ref. 8, p. 920].

The following comments suggested a potential for programmatic orientation by the House Budget Committee:

#### Views of Several Minority Committee Members

"We are concerned by the seemingly cavalier treatment accorded our national defense needs by the Committee. While we believe that some cuts can be legitimately supported, excess cuts in the defense program for reasons of short-term fiscal expediency are dangerous if they lead to significantly reduced readiness of our forces. The broad brush treatment given to program growth could result in unduly downgrading our defense effort" [Ref. 47, pp. 94-96].

#### Views of Hon. Robert L. Leggett

Congressman Leggett referred to the need to review more closely individual programs such as B-1, F-16, F-18, Trident, Attack Helicopters, and Cruise Missiles [Ref. 53, p. 113].

#### Views of Hons. Burleson, Landrum, and Runnels

These Congressmen spoke of need to review force structures, inventory levels, modernization of naval forces and balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weaponry. In referring to the above items they stated, "we strongly oppose any reductions in funding for our Nation's defense at this time" [Ref. 53, p. 119].

## 2. Senate Budget Committee

The following statements suggested a fiscal orientation.

"In National Defense the first budget resolution sought implementation of administrative and legislative economies ..." [Ref. 57, p. 6].

"The Committee did not examine all of the major policy issues raised by the programs in this functional area (National Defense) in order to arrive at recommended outlay and budget authority limits" [Ref. 48, p. 44].

"The Budget Committee intends to meet its responsibility under the Budget Act to review congressional spending actions and recommend measures to reconcile revenue and spending actions with appropriate fiscal policy" [Ref. 48, p. 3].

"The Committee is not persuaded by the arguments in the President's budget that 1976, a year of extraordinary fiscal strain, must be the year of major initiatives to expand or recoup foregone defense investment. The recommendations reflect an adjustment for a more realistic 10 percent rate of inflation" [Ref. 48, p. 43].

"In general these functional totals are intended to represent broad priorities, and do not imply judgments as to the mix of programs which the authorizing committees and Appropriations Committee may subsequently wish to include within the established targets" [Ref. 54, p. 2].

### Views of Senator Alan Cranston

"Although there are numerous cases to be made, I do not believe the Budget Committee is the appropriate forum to debate the merits of particular weapon systems, foreign military sales, or other specifics. There is huge real growth in the defense budget request approved by the Budget Committee. I see no valid reason for it. I believe it should be cut by \$3.5B from the level of the Committee Resolution" [Ref. 54, p. 120].

The following statements suggested a potential for programmatic orientation by the Senate Budget Committee:

"The Committee considered using a mission approach to assess the content of the defense budget. Such an approach would allow the total resources devoted to each major defense mission to be considered in light of foreign policy requirement and defense strategy. The Committee looks forward to working with the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in developing such a mission framework" [Ref. 48, p. 44].

"The Committee voted unanimously to require the Defense Department to be prepared to discuss its fiscal 1978 budget requests in terms of specific missions that would be accomplished and the relation of those missions to U.S. interests in the world at large and in various areas of the world. It is the Committee's judgement that without such mission oriented budget discussions, it is not possible effectively to analyze the relationship between military spending and U.S. objectives and other priorities" [Ref. 54, p. 3]

"Mission area budgets will provide the Committee with a valuable tool for analyzing military activities and proposed purchases and comparing these proposals with military and foreign policy strategies and requirements" [Ref. 54, p. 21].

Views of Senators James L. Buckley and James A. McClure

"The Budget Committee should avoid placing a rigid ceiling on the FY 1977 defense budget ... Rather, attention should be devoted to the FY 1978 defense budget for it is here that the Congress can have a direct influence over the entire composition of the U.S. defense posture. An opportunity would be provided to deliberate over the nature of U.S. foreign policy, commitments and the nature of the military forces we should deploy to support them. Long-range decisions could be taken which would provide the type of guidance which makes for intelligent defense planning ... Such long-term planning on the part of the Budget Committee would provide a smoother integration of effort with the responsive substantive committees (Armed Services and Defense Appropriations) ... We believe the Budget Committee can bring about a vast improvement in governmental decisionmaking in defense and other areas by looking into longer term projections on which to base their annual recommendations" [Ref. 48, p. 152].

Views of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

"Our defense strategy and budget should be developed in the context of our foreign policy and security. Our foreign policy and our military force structure should be interrelated. During its deliberations the Committee has tried to probe the relationships between international events and the level of our armed forces with little success. Without such guidance, it is difficult to measure the true needs for defense. I hope the Committee will persist in its efforts" [Ref. 54, p. 134].

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

### A. FISCAL OR PROGRAMMATIC

It would have to be concluded from this study that for the period FY76 - FY77 Congress, through its committee budgetary process, was fairly equally divided between a fiscal and programmatic orientation in relation to the Defense Budget. Overall the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees demonstrated a slightly more programmatic nature; however, the fiscal nature of the Budget Committees tends to balance out the overall Congressional fiscal/programmatic orientation.

Figure 9 combines all the recorded decisions of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and illustrates the overall fiscal/programmatic orientation of these committees.




Figure 9

Figures 10 and 11, respectively, illustrate the combined Armed Services and Appropriations Committee decisions by Procurement and RDT&E titles.

Combined Procurement Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 10

Combined RDT&E Committee Decisions By Category  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 11

Figure 12 shows the distribution of the combined Armed Services and Appropriations Committee decisions by subcategories used in the Content Analysis.<sup>3</sup>

It can be noted from Figure 12 that if Blackmon's [Ref. 4] criteria of coding "no reason" decisions as fiscal were applied, the overall orientation of the committees would shift to Fiscal - 50%, Programmatic - 44%, and Other - 6%.

This study supports Lukenas' [Ref. 23] finding that the House Appropriations Committee is predominately fiscal in nature. Blackmon [Ref. 4] in his study of the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that the orientation of the committee was primarily fiscal, but the overall trend of programmatic activity was one of a steadily increasing nature. This study found that the Senate Armed Services Committee was more programmatic which would tend to support the increasing programmatic nature of Blackmon's finding.

In the ever changing role of Congress it could be assumed from this study that Congress has reached a fairly stable fiscal/programmatic level in dealing with the Defense Budget. Congress is still keenly concerned with eliminating

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<sup>3</sup>The total percentages for the Programmatic and Other Categories in Figure 12 are different from those shown in Figure 9 due to rounding.

Combined Committee Decisions by Subcategory  
FY76 - FY77




Figure 12



waste and reducing spending, but is also beginning to show more of a desire to influence overall Defense policy and individual program goals. This study suggests that witnesses testifying before Congress on the Defense Budget must be thoroughly familiar with both fiscal and programmatic aspects of a weapons system or program. These witnesses must be able to support and defend all cost elements as well as being able to explain how a program affects force readiness, inventory levels, and the requirement for the weapons system to meet any present or perceived enemy threats.

B. IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT  
CONTROL ACT OF 1974

Probably the greatest impact of the Budget Act is the general feeling that Congress has regained some of its lost power over the federal purse. Through passage of the First and Second Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget, the Budget Committees establish overall targets and ceilings to guide the other committees as they consider requests for funding. Neither house of Congress may take any action which will cause spending to exceed the budgeted level.

The impact of the Budget Committees was clearly demonstrated on August 1, 1975 when Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, succeeded in having the Armed Services Committee Conference Report on the FY76 Budget rejected on the Senate floor by a vote of 42 - 48.

The Report, said Muskie, "will inevitably bust the budget target for national defense" [Ref. 8, p. 365]. Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that it would be "unthinkable" to send the committees back to conference; but that is exactly what happened. A second Conference Report was presented and finally approved by the Senate on September 26, 1975 [Ref. 8, p. 378].

The House Appropriations Committee expressed the influence of the Budget Act through the following statement: "The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 increased the role of the Congress in budget and fiscal policy making and required additional attention to total federal spending. Because the Defense Department budget accounts for a significant part of all Federal expenditures, the Committee was especially careful to assess the results of its recommendations on DOD budget outlays" [Ref. 41, p. 13].

The House Armed Services Committee also expressed concern for the new budget procedures: "To make the necessary detailed recommendations to the Budget Committee this year, the Committee on Armed Services has had to examine the total Defense budget request more extensively than in the past. The committee is recommending a revision of procedures next year which will require annual authorization prior to appropriation for all military functions administered by the Department of Defense" [Ref. 38, pp. 14-15].

All provisions of the new budgetary timetable were not fully implemented until processing of the FY77 Budget; however, several committees felt the "pinch" of the timetable in both FY76 and FY77. Following are several comments indicating this:

FY76 Armed Services Committee

"For the first time this year, the committee had to work within the procedures established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The committee substantially met the deadline of May 15 for reporting the military authorization bill, although it required a great deal of effort and compression of schedule" [Ref. 36, p. 4].

FY77 Armed Services Committee

"The committee met the deadline of May 15 for reporting the military authorization bill, although it was very difficult and required a great deal of intense effort. In particular, the committee had to mark up prior to the final passage of the Congressional Budget Resolution and therefore without full knowledge of the final Defense Budget targets. The schedule set forth in the Congressional Budget Act is difficult to maintain and ought to be reviewed" [Ref. 39, pp. 6-7].

FY77 House Appropriations Committee

"The accelerated appropriation bill schedule mandated by the Budget Control Act precluded the Committee from waiting for final authorization action before marking up the Defense Appropriation Bill. There are probably programs for which the Committee is recommending funds which will not be authorized" [Ref. 44, pp. 4-5].

The FY76 Defense Appropriation Bill was not signed by the President until February 10, 1976, a date considerably after the start of the fiscal year on July 1, 1975. Congress successfully met its new timetable in 1976 and

completed action on the FY77 Defense Appropriation Bill on September 13, 1976, prior to the start of the new fiscal year on October 1, 1976. The Bill was signed by the President on September 22, 1976 [Ref. 9, p. 2629]. This was the first time in years that a Defense Appropriation Bill had been passed prior to the start of the fiscal year. It will be interesting to observe if Congress can continue to meet its established budgetary timeframes.

The Congressional Budget Office was created with high expectations; however, the Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported on June 5, 1976 that "in its year and a half of existence, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has lived up to almost none of these expectations" [Ref. 9, p. 1430]. Nevertheless an impact of the CBO will be felt by the Defense Department. A newspaper article in the San Jose Mercury on December 30, 1976, gives an example of the impact of the CBO on the Defense establishment. It stated, "The Congressional Budget Office suggested Wednesday that the Army was buying the wrong type of helicopter and planning to form the wrong kind of division if it is expected to fight a short, intense war in Europe. The CBO study said Congress must re-examine some of the expensive weapons procurement plans of the Army" [Ref. 1]. The CBO could prove to be a strong influence on Congress as it makes its decisions concerning the Defense Budget.

### C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study was only a small part of the continuing effort to observe the changing role of Congress as it acts to shape Defense policy. It was suggested that Congress has reached somewhat of an equilibrium in its fiscal/programmatic orientation. Future studies of individual committees as well as Congress as a whole will be needed to determine if this trend will continue or if Congress will shift to a more heavily fiscal or programmatic nature. It will be interesting to study Congress' handling of mission area budgets beginning with the FY79 Defense Budget.

The present and future impact of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was only briefly analyzed in this thesis. Further research on the significance of the Budget Committees and other provisions of this Act will be needed. Studies should be conducted on the Congressional Budget Office and individual committee staffs to determine the influence of these support activities on the budgetary process.

APPENDIX A

WORKSHEET FORMAT FOR RECORDING COMMITTEE DECISIONS  
(Note: 829 individual decisions were recorded in this manner)

Senate Armed Services Committee  
Title I - Procurement  
FY 1976 & 1977

<u>No.</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Ref. P.</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Category</u>	
						<u>Subcategory</u>	<u>Final</u>
1.	N	F-14 Tomcat	32	-40M	Navy requested full funding in FY77 for 9 planes even though it does not plan to use all of the funds during this FY. Committee recommends this reduction since the funds will not be needed until FY77.	IR	F
2.	AF	Sidewinder Missile	51	-22.9M	Purpose of this procurement was to stockpile the AIM-9H missile for possible future foreign sales to allies. Since the missile is not usable by the Air Force and also since procurement of military equipment for sale to foreign countries would be in violation of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Committee recommends deletion of the request.	FP	P

<u>No.</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Ref. P.</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Category</u>	
						<u>Subcategory</u>	<u>Final</u>
3.	N	Patrol Hydrofoil Missile Ship	56	-168.4M	Committee believes that current problems along with substantial increases in cost dictate a program slowdown. Committee action is taken in reflection of program management problems.	PM	F
4.	A	M60 Tank	13 & 61	-78.3M	Laser range finder and solid state computer product improvements were not demonstrating sufficiently increased effectiveness to warrant the cost of these improvements. Committee deferred the funds until Army can demonstrate the cost effectiveness of system.	CT	F

Senate Armed Services Committee  
Title II - RDT&E  
FY 1976 & 1977

<u>No.</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Ref. P.</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Category</u>	
						<u>Subcategory</u>	<u>Final</u>
1.	A	Chaparral Missile	90	-14.6M	Committee is astounded at inconsistent planning. Committee is deleting R&D funds until Army can arrive at a rational long term development and procurement program.	P/J	P

No.	Service	Program	Ref. P.	Action	Reason	Category	
						Subcategory	Final
2.	AF	F-16	97	-64.7M	These funds have been identified by Air Force as not being needed this year.	DOD	O
3.	AF	AWACS	24	RA 253.7M	Committee feels this system is needed for its tactical capability and to fit into NATO scenario.	TP	P
4.	AF	B-1 Bomber	15	-114.3M	The highly complex issue of whether there is a need for a follow-on manned strategic bomber, and if so whether the B-1 is the best answer, has not yet been resolved and is the major reason for reduction.	SP	P

House Appropriations Committee  
Title IV - Procurement  
FY 1977

No.	Service	Program	Ref. P.	Action	Reason	Category	
						Subcategory	Final
1.	N	A-6E	136	+125M	Committee does not consider it prudent to terminate production and cause Navy/Marine Corps to experience a shortfall of all weather attack assets in later years.	FS/E	P



No.	Service	Program	Ref. P.	Action	Reason	Category	
						Subcategory	Final
2.	N	UH-1 Simulator	138	+3M	Procurement is required as a result of Committee's decision not to consolidate all basic helicopter flight training at Fort Rucker, Alabama.	CP	P
3.	N	Intelligence 15 & Program 147		-6.7M	Due to classified nature of activity, reasons cannot be given in Report.	NR	O
4.	AF	A-7D	150	+120M	Committee feels too little emphasis has been placed on modernizing our guard and reserve forces. Committee recommends these funds in order to accelerate the pace in the modernization of our Air National Guard.	FM	P
5.	AF	Glide Bomb	156	-23.7M	Committee supports this program but does not feel it is ready to enter production stage; there is too much R&D left to do to test out system, request for production is considered premature.	DEV	P

# KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Service</u>	<u>Ref. P.</u>	<u>Action</u> (In dollars)	<u>Subcategory</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Final</u>
A - Army	Page of	+ Increase or	CT - Cost		F - Fiscal
N - Navy	Report	add-on.	IR - Improper Request		P - Programmatic
AF - Air Force	where	- Decrease or	PM - Program Management		O - Other
MC - Marine Corps	decision	deletion.	FP - Foreign Policy		
	is found.	RA Recommend approval as requested.	TP - Tactical Program		
		RS Restore amount.	SP - Strategic Program		
			DEV - Developmental		
			FS/E - Force Structure/Effectiveness		
			CP - Congressional Policy		
			FM - Force Modernization		
			P/J - Planning/Justification		
			NR - No Reason		
			DOD - Department of Defense Action		
			CA - Conforms to Authorization		

## APPENDIX B

### CATEGORY VERIFICATION SHEET

#### CATEGORIES

1. Fiscal (F) - This category includes those decisions that reflect committee efforts to eliminate waste and inefficiency and are clearly not associated with Defense policy or program goals. The expressed committee direction is towards a reduction in Defense spending.
2. Programmatic (P) - This category includes those decisions that reflect committee efforts to shape Defense programs and specific weapons systems to conform to desired committee policies, goals, and directions concerning National Defense. The committee is less concerned with total spending and more concerned with strengthening the force structure, determining the types and numbers of weapons systems, increasing capabilities, improving technology, etc.

#### SAMPLE DECISIONS

1. Committee is concerned with force modernization or expressed desire for technically improving equipment considered obsolete or inadequate to meet a threat.
2. Committee feels that management of program contributes to waste and inefficient use of funds and feels that better management would result in more favorable cost, prices, etc.

Coding - Indicate a F or P

Original Coding	Independent Judges	Final Coding
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	

P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
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F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
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	Original Coding	Independent Judges							Final Coding
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
3. Committee feels that system is not needed since a comparable system is available or a present system could be modified at lower cost.	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
4. Committee is concerned with force levels, structures, effectiveness, capabilities, readiness posture, etc.	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
5. Committee feels that program is too costly, expensive or not cost effective.	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
6. Funds are not required at this time; system will not be procured until a subsequent fiscal year.	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
7. Committee is concerned with possible or actual effects of defense policy as related to international treaties, commitments, alliances or perceived role of U.S. in international context.	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
8. Funding request is in direct violation of Congressional policy, procedure, or direction.	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
9. Committee feels that request is premature - development is incomplete, further study, testing, design, operational evaluation, etc. is needed.	P	F	P	F	P	P	P	P	P
10. Committee feels that excessive expenditures can be eliminated by prohibiting duplication of efforts.	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

	Original Coding	Independent Judges 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Final Coding
11. Committee is concerned with maintaining an independent U.S. technological base independent of NATO actions.	P	P P P P P P P	P
12. Committee is concerned with inventory levels.	P	P P P P P P P	P
13. Committee feels there is no justification or inadequate justification for program.	F	F P P P P P P	P*
14. The request for percentage increase in funds is too large in Committee opinion.	F	F F F F F F F	F
15. Committee desires to cut back on expenditures in any case where mission capability, readiness posture, etc. will not be affected.	F	F F F F F F F	F
16. Committee is concerned with schedule slippage resulting from technical/developmental difficulties.	P	P P P P P P P	P
17. Committee feels another system can satisfy the tactical requirement better than this system.	P	P P P P P P P	P
18. There are unexplainable costs, cost overruns, government and contractor cost estimates are different.	F	F F F F F F F	F
19. Committee feels that system characteristics, specifications, capabilities, etc. have not been adequately defined.	P	P P P P P P P	P
20. Program worth is not equal to funds expended.	F	F F F F F F F	F

	Original Coding		Independent Judges							Final Coding
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
21. Committee is concerned with cost but recognizes the need to improve strategic capabilities.	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
22. Service has presented no management plan or design for program.	F		P	P	P	P	P	F	P	P*
23. Committee unable to determine need or purpose for system.	F		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P*
24. Even though Congress supports NATO alliances, it will not approve actions that adversely affect U.S. defense posture and capabilities.	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
25. Committee is concerned with problems referred to as technical, developmental, redesign, operational, etc.	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

\*Changed from original coding of F to final coding of P.

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